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PREEMPTING PLAINTIFF CITIES 
By Sarah L. Swan* 
ABSTRACT 
Within the city-state relationship, states hold an enormous amount 
of power. Recently, states have been using that power to pass 
extremely aggressive preemption laws that prohibit cities’ regulatory 
efforts on many fronts.  These new preemption laws most commonly 
occur in the context of red states limiting the regulatory scope of blue 
cities, inflaming those already tense city-state relationships and 
cutting into what many view as the appropriate scope of local 
autonomy. 
But despite this intense clash in the regulatory sphere, when we 
move away from the world of city regulation and toward the world of 
city litigation, things look surprisingly different.  Although cities have 
been bringing forward hundreds of quite controversial claims against 
corporate wrongdoers for harms ranging from the subprime mortgage 
crisis to the opioid epidemic, such plaintiff city litigation has provoked 
relatively little state hostility.  States have not ratcheted up their 
response to this exercise of city power in at all the same way as they 
have for regulation.  Rather, states have shown a remarkably limited 
appetite for preempting plaintiff city litigation. 
What accounts for these differing responses?  Three main factors 
are likely in play.  First, while regulatory preemption is largely the 
result of intense political polarization, states have historically viewed 
litigation against corporate wrongdoers in less partisan terms.  Both 
blue and red states have themselves engaged in this type of litigation, 
and there is thus an institutional tradition of flexibility in this context.  
Second, and relatedly, the issues at the heart of plaintiff city litigation 
are often not as politically divisive as those at the heart of the 
 
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Many thanks to 
Nestor Davidson, Marie-Amelie George, the participants of the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal Symposium “Reimagining Localism,” and the participants of the 7th Annual 
State and Local Government Works-in-Progress Conference for their comments and 
conversations. 
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preempted regulations.  Harms like lead paint poisoning and the 
opioid epidemic have attracted widespread condemnation, while 
many of the regulation preemption subjects remain hotly contested.  
Finally, unlike regulation, litigation is not an obvious instrument of 
governance.  It has unpredictable outcomes, it is not an exclusively 
governmental power, and it relies on existing law. 
Since plaintiff city litigation operates mostly outside of state 
crosshairs, it can provide a space for cities looking to pursue 
progressive goals.  Plaintiff city litigation may not achieve the same 
immediate governance goals as regulation, but it does have significant 
political benefits for cities and their residents.  Thus, even in an era of 
rampant regulatory preemption and deep political animosity between 
cities and states, plaintiff city litigation presents a viable parallel track 
for cities to continue their pursuit of urban social justice.  Although 
such litigation does not directly address the contentious issues 
forming the basis of regulatory battles, it does offer a means of 
protecting vulnerable communities and advancing goals of democratic 
equality in other ways. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Within the city-state relationship, states hold enormous power.1  
Lately, states have been exercising that power by passing extremely 
broad, extremely aggressive laws that preempt and prohibit cities’ 
regulatory efforts on many fronts.2  Variously called “hyper 
preemption,”3 the “new preemption,”4 “super preemption,”5 “nuclear 
preemption,”6 or “maximum preemption,”7 these new state efforts 
remove significant regulatory authority from cities, and typically 
function to stop municipalities from enacting socially progressive or 
liberal-leaning regulation.8  They occur in a wide variety of contexts, 
targeting everything from sprinklers and plastic bags, to minimum 
wage ordinances, and anti-discrimination laws.9 
While “conflicts between statehouses and city halls” are nothing 
new,10 these new preemption laws dramatically differ from the old 
ones in both quantity and quality.  Quantitatively, preemption activity 
has increased significantly every year since 2011, and shows no signs 
of slowing down.11  In fact, given that conservative political groups 
like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) offer and 
 
 1. Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 
1165 (2018). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Erin Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State and Local 
Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1473 (2018). 
 4. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1995, 1997 (2018). 
 5. Simon Davis-Cohen, The Latest Weapon Against Local Democracy? “Super 
Preemption,” PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://progressive.org/dispatches/super-
preemption-local-democracy-180308/ [https://perma.cc/6MNP-GACC]. 
 6. Briffault, supra note 4. 
 7. Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to 
Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403, 405 (2017). 
 8. Briffault, supra note 4, at 1997, 1998. 
 9. Id. at 1999–2002; see also Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: 
State Preemption of Progressive Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225, 2242–
43 (2017). 
 10. William D. Hicks et al., Home Rule Be Damned: Exploring Policy Conflicts 
Between the Statehouse and City Hall, 51 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 26, 26 (2018). 
 11. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 406.  Indeed, “2015 saw ‘more efforts to 
undermine local control on more issues than any other year in history.’” Id. (quoting 
Brendan Fischer, Corporate Interests Take Aim at Local Democracy, PR WATCH 
(Feb. 3, 2016, 10:26 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2016/02/13029/2016-ALEC-
local-control [https://perma.cc/9GA6-NQJE]). 
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encourage the use of preemption law templates,12 preemption activity 
is only expected to grow. 
Qualitatively, the new preemption laws differ from the old in a 
number of ways.  First, the new preemption laws are punitive.13  
Individual local officials can be sued, fined, or removed (or some 
combination of all three) for trying to enact regulations in prohibited 
fields.14  Local governments can also be fiscally penalized for such 
attempts, either through the withholding of state funds, or through 
fines.15  Second, some new preemption laws fundamentally alter what 
steps local governments can take to challenge state preemption.16  In 
part because of these features, preemption laws have been the source 
of intense consternation, and are a site of deepening animosity 
between state and local governments.17   
Given the high-intensity city-state conflict evident in regulatory 
preemption, it is perhaps surprising that when we move away from 
the world of city regulation and into the world of city litigation, things 
look drastically different.  Cities have increasingly been using 
litigation, in addition to regulation, as a tool to achieve progressive 
ends and have been bringing forward hundreds of quite controversial 
claims against corporate wrongdoers in contexts like the opioid 
epidemic, the financial crisis, lead paint poisoning, and climate 
change.18  Yet states have not responded with anywhere near the fury 
that they have displayed on the regulatory front. Rather, states have 
adopted a relatively restrained approach to city litigation, and much 
city litigation continues unimpeded by state intervention.19 
 
 12. Id. at 405–06; Kriston Capps, The Cities that Are Fighting Back Against State 
Intervention, CITYLAB (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/cities-
fighting-back-against-state-intervention/502232/ [https://perma.cc/5VE2-KSR6]; see, 
e.g., Living Wage Mandate Preemption Act, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL (Jan. 
28, 2013), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/living-wage-mandate-preemption-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/JN93-AH3X] (providing a model preemption statute for minimum 
wage ordinances). 
 13. Phillips, supra note 9, at 2247. 
 14. Lisa Gonzalez, Infographic: The Threat of Super-Preemption to US Cities, 
INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (May 11, 2017), https://ilsr.org/infographic-the-threat-
of-super-preemption-to-us-cities/ [https://perma.cc/RR2V-92EM]. 
 15. Phillips, supra note 9, at 2247, 2250. 
 16. Id. at 2250. 
 17. See Abby Rapoport, Blue Cities, Red States, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://prospect.org/article/blue-cities-battle-red-states [https://perma.cc/YYK9-L8N8]. 
 18. See Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1285–86 (2018).  
States sometimes also bring litigation targeting these harms, but cities are motivated 
to maintain their own lawsuits for a number of reasons. Id. at 1272–73. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II. 
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This Article addresses this paradox.  It describes the current state 
of city litigation preemption, explains the reasons why states have 
been relatively non-confrontational in this area, and argues that even 
in this era of rampant regulatory preemption, plaintiff city litigation 
presents a viable means of accomplishing certain progressive goals.  
While the possibility of litigation preemption battles constantly looms 
over plaintiff city litigation, city litigation is often in the shared 
interest of both cities and states.  Such interest alignment suggests 
that plaintiff city litigation may well continue to escape the fate of 
preempted regulation. 
Part I of this Article descriptively maps the litigation preemption 
landscape.  It sets out the means by which states can preempt city 
litigation and explores the instances in which states have done so.  
This Part shows that while there have been strong state-city 
disagreements over plaintiff city litigation, to date, litigation 
preemption has not undergone nearly the same kind of aggressive 
overhaul as regulatory preemption.  Indeed, in a number of recent 
examples, states have actually backed down from legal confrontations 
with cities over such litigation.20 
Part II explains why city litigation has thus far been mostly spared 
the venomous state response that has befallen regulation.  First, the 
new regulatory preemption is largely the result of extreme political 
polarization—specifically Republican-led states clashing with 
Democratic-led cities.21  This political dynamic is muted in the 
litigation context.  States themselves have a history of engaging in 
bipartisan litigation against third-party wrongdoers and have long 
been able to overlook partisan differences when it comes to 
litigation.22  Institutionally, such historical flexibility likely enables 
states to avoid myopic political entrenchment about city litigation as 
well.  States and cities are typically compelled to expend enormous 
resources as a result of the litigated harms,23 and where there is a 
possibility of recouping some of this expense, states are able to look 
past their ideological differences in favor of a shared benefit for all. 
 
 20. See discussion infra Part II. 
 21. Briffault, supra note 4; Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 406; Vladimir 
Kogan, Means, Motives, and Opportunities in the New Preemption Wars, 51 PS: POL. 
SCI. & POL. 28, 28–29 (2018). 
 22. PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND 
NATIONAL POLICY MAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 28 (2015). 
 23. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 18, at 1242 (discussing costs to cities arising from 
the opioid epidemic). 
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Second, the issues that cities litigate are often much less politically 
polarizing than those that they regulate.  There is general, 
widespread, bipartisan agreement that the opioid epidemic, lead paint 
poisoning, and the sub-prime mortgage crisis are serious harms.24  
Conversely, there is much less agreement on issues like sanctuary 
cities, local minimum wage laws, and the appropriate scope of anti-
discrimination laws.25 
Third, while regulation is obviously a form of governance, litigation 
is a much subtler tool.26  Litigation is more commonly viewed as a 
form of law enforcement, rather than law creation, and in that sense, 
it appears non-threatening to those who prefer maintenance of the 
status quo to progressive change.  Plaintiff city litigation does have 
important political functions, in that it helps to define polities and 
sends valuable expressive messages,27 but it does not implicate 
questions of governing power the way regulation does. 
Part III explores the political possibilities for plaintiff city 
litigation. Although such litigation does not address the contentious 
issues forming the basis of regulatory battles, it does, as I have argued 
earlier, offer a means of protecting vulnerable communities in other 
ways.28  Thus, even in an era of rampant regulatory preemption and 
deep political animosity between cities and states, plaintiff city 
litigation currently remains a viable parallel track for cities to 
continue pursuing urban social justice. 
I.  FORMS OF LITIGATION PREEMPTION 
Just as states can preempt and prohibit city regulation, they can 
also preempt and prohibit plaintiff city litigation.  This Part describes 
 
 24. Indeed, states themselves engaged in bipartisan litigation against the major 
banks for their role in creating the mortgage crisis.  States are also investigating the 
opioid manufacturers. Press Release, Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., N.Y. 
Att’y Gen.’s Press Office, A.G. Schneiderman, Bipartisan Coalition of AGs Expand 
Multistate Investigation into Opioid Crisis (Sept. 19, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-bipartisan-coalition-ags-expand-multistate-investigation-
opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/428N-QD48].  Many states passed regulations 
governing lead paint remediation and treatment. Katrina S. Korfmacher & Michael 
L. Hanley, Are Local Laws the Key to Ending Childhood Lead Poisoning?, 38 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 757, 757 (2013). 
 25. However, there are preemption laws over seemingly innocuous areas like 
plastic bags and sprinklers as well. Briffault, supra note 4. 
 26. See NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 163 (describing litigation as only “subtly 
regulatory”). 
 27. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1285. 
 28. Id. 
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the means by which states preempt plaintiff city litigation: namely, by 
entering into settlements that preclude cities from litigating, directly 
suing cities to stop plaintiff city litigation, and by passing legislation 
that prohibits such litigation. 
A. State Settlements that Preclude City Claims 
State-city preemption can occur through state settlements with 
third parties.  The best example of this arose in the tobacco litigation 
context, when state-initiated tobacco litigation ultimately resulted in 
the Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”), one of the largest 
civil settlements in American history.29 The story of this preemption-
by-settlement actually begins with a story of typical, standard 
regulatory preemption.  In 1985, Florida, influenced heavily by the 
tobacco lobby, became the first state to preempt local smoking laws.30  
But soon after this regulatory preemption occurred, the tobacco 
lobby’s fortunes changed, as states (and two cities) began to sue 
tobacco companies in the late 1980s.31  When the MSA was eventually 
signed, it both ended the existing litigation and functioned as a form 
of litigation preemption for cities that did not join the initial 
litigation.32  It precluded prospective plaintiff cities from litigation 
harms caused by tobacco.33 
As “creatures of the state,” municipalities and other sub-state 
governmental entities “have only those powers granted to them by 
the state.”34  Accordingly, in the MSA, many state attorneys general 
could agree not only to relinquish their own future legal claims 
against the tobacco industry, but also those of their municipalities and 
 
 29. The estimated value at the time of settlement was $105 billion. David M. 
Cutler et al., The Economic Impacts of the Tobacco Settlement, 21 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 1 (2002). 
 30. Preemption of Smokefree Air Laws in Florida, AM. FOR NONSMOKERS’ 
RIGHTS, 
http://www.protectlocalcontrol.org/docs/Florida%20preemption%20factsheet_2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4LM-UY6M]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Peter Enrich, The Preclusive Effect of the MSA on Future Actions by State 
and Local Governments Against Participating Manufacturers, in THE MULTISTATE 
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF STATE AND LOCAL 
TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TOPICS AND PROVISIONS OF THE 
MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 23, 1998 37 (Graham 
Kelder & Patricia Davidson eds., 1999). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Enrich, supra note 32, at 39. 
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other sub-state governmental entities.35  So when Wayne County, 
Michigan, for example, filed a suit against tobacco companies shortly 
after the MSA was signed, the County’s case was dismissed on the 
basis that the state attorney general had released the tobacco 
defendants from the County’s potential claims.36  Wayne County was 
thus unable to seek or obtain compensation for its alleged tobacco 
related injuries.37 
However, not every state was able to so easily preclude its 
municipalities from initiating tobacco suits.  The authority of state 
attorneys general to bind their municipalities ultimately depends on 
state law, and states’ laws differ.38  Accordingly, at least one city, St. 
Louis, successfully defeated a preclusion challenge when it launched a 
suit against tobacco.39  The MSA, though, foresaw and prepared for 
this potential complication.  It incorporated terms to minimize the 
effect of such plaintiff city suits, and included a provision that deducts 
any damages a locality might recover from those received by the 
state.40  The MSA also explicitly gives states the right to intervene in 
such city suits.41  The MSA thus leaves states well-incentivized and 
well-equipped to deter any potential city suits that they did not have 
overt authority under state law to prohibit.42 
 
 35. Id.  States could not, however, “release private claims for compensation due 
to injuries from smoking.  As the Georgia Supreme Court stated, for purposes of 
preclusion in a private suit following a state parens (patriae) action, ‘the State and its 
citizens can be privies . . . only with regard to public claims; they cannot be privies 
with regard to private claims.’” Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and 
Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2344 (2016). 
 36. In Re: Certified Question from the U.S. District Court Wayne County v. 
Philip Morris, 638 N.W.2d 409 (Mich. 2002); see also Daniel Fisher, Cities vs. States: 
A Looming Battle for Control of High-Stakes Opioid Litigation, FORBES (Mar. 28, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/28/cities-vs-states-a-
looming-battle-for-control-of-high-stakes-opioid-litigation/#6c463e074b5d 
[https://perma.cc/h63h-t8pe]. 
 37. In Re: Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Ct. Wayne Cty. v. Philip Morris, 
638 N.W.2d at 411. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See City of St. Louis v. American Tobacco., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Mo. 
1999).  Ultimately, approximately thirteen years after the suit was filed, the case was 
heard before a jury, and the City lost. See Kelsey Volkmann, Jury Sides with Big 
Tobacco over Missouri Hospitals, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (Apr. 29, 2011), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2011/04/29/jury-sides-with-big-tobacco-
over.html [https://perma.cc/6KJD-4V83]. 
 40. Enrich, supra note 32, at 39–40. 
 41. Id. at 40. 
 42. Id. 
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B. State-City Lawsuits 
States may also seek court orders to stop city litigation.  For 
example, in State v. City of Dover,43 two New Hampshire cities, 
Dover and Portsmouth, brought suit against various defendants for 
the harms caused by the gasoline additive MTBE.44  New Hampshire, 
though, had already brought an MTBE suit, and it sued to have the 
cities’ suits stopped.  New Hampshire claimed that the Cities’ lawsuit 
was redundant,45 while the two cities claimed that their lawsuit was 
necessary because the New Hampshire suit failed to represent their 
interests.46  Specifically, the Cities argued that the state suit did not 
sue enough defendants, did not incorporate all the viable liability 
theories, sought different remedies from the city suit, and was 
vulnerable to specific regulatory defenses that were exclusive to the 
state, but not relevant to the cities.47  These arguments failed to 
convince the New Hampshire Supreme Court.48  The court held that 
the Cities’ suit “must yield” to the State’s suit, because the State had 
parens patriae standing to bring its claim, and there was “no reason to 
conclude” that it would not adequately represent the cities’ 
interests.49 
Arkansas also recently sought to preempt city litigation through a 
court order.  The State of Arkansas initiated an opioid lawsuit against 
 
 43. 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006).  See also the discussion of this case in Margaret 
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys 
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 521–22 (2012), and in Swan, supra note 18, at 1273. 
 44. MTBE, which stands for methyl tertiary butyl ether, makes the water supply 
odorous and terrible to taste, and it may cause cancer. See Elizabeth Thornburg, 
Public as Private and Private as Public: MTBE Litigation in the United States, in 
CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS SHAPE 
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 342, 344 (Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016). 
 45. 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006). 
 46. Id. at 531. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 534. 
 49. See also State of New Hampshire v. Hess Corporation, 20 A.3d 212 (N.H. 
2011).  In Hess, the court equated the Cities’ initiation of a lawsuit in Dover to an 
intervention in an existing law suit.  The court suggested that in Dover, the applicable 
test should have been the one set out in Envtl Def. Fund, Inc. v. Higginson: 
“Higginson held that a person or entity seeking to maintain a separate suit, as the 
cities here seek to do, must overcome the ‘presumption of adequate representation. 
A minimal showing that the representation is inadequate is not sufficient. The 
applicant for intervention must demonstrate that its interest is in fact different from 
that of the state and that that interest will not be represented by the state.’” Dover, 
891 A.2d at 531 (quoting Env’t Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738, 740 
(D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
1250 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
 
three defendants, but a consortium of fifteen cities and seventy-five 
counties launched their own lawsuit, in which they sued 
approximately sixty defendants. Notably, they also included the State 
as a plaintiff.50  The Arkansas State Attorney General petitioned the 
Supreme Court, seeking a finding that only the state’s Attorney 
General’s Office had the authority to bring forward opioid 
litigation.51  In the Attorney General’s own words, her petition was 
“about who represents the people and the State of Arkansas.”52  In 
April 2018, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the Attorney 
General’s petition, issuing a “one-sentence denial” rebuffing the 
claim.53 
C. Preemption through Legislation: Implied, Express, and Super 
Another path to preempting litigation is legislative, as states have 
broad powers to legislatively preempt plaintiff city litigation.  This 
broad legislative power operates in three main ways: through implied 
preemption, through express preemption, and sometimes, through 
 
 50. David Ramsey, Attorney General Leslie Rutledge in Spat with Cities and 
Counties over Opioid Lawsuits, ARK. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2018, 11:44 PM), 
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2018/04/04/attorney-general-leslie-
rutledge-in-spat-with-cities-and-counties-over-opioid-lawsuits 
[https://perma.cc/VW3F-Q9YZ]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. David Ramsey, State Supreme Court Denies Attorney General Leslie 
Rutledge’s Request to Pull Prosecutor from Opioid Lawsuit, ARK. BLOG (Apr. 6, 
2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2018/04/06/state-
supreme-court-denies-attorney-general-leslie-rutledges-request-to-pull-prosecutor-
from-opioid-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/68FS-K785].  The court’s ruling consisted of a 
statement that the “petitioner’s emergency petition for writ of mandamus is denied,” 
but gave virtually no explanation as to the grounds for the dismissal. See Wesley 
Brown, AG Rutledge Loses ‘Writ of Mandamus’ Request, Second Opioid Lawsuit 
May Proceed with ‘State Actor,’ TALK BUS. & POL. (Apr. 6, 2018, 4:29 PM), 
https://talkbusiness.net/2018/04/ag-rutledge-loses-writ-of-mandamus-request-second-
opioid-lawsuit-may-proceed-with-state-actor/ [https://perma.cc/6WYG-9YG2].  But 
in Alabama, a court dismissed a case filed by a district attorney after the state 
attorney general filed a “notice of dismissal.”  Ex parte King, 59 So. 3d 21 (Ala. 
2010), discussed in NAAG, Decisions Affecting the Powers and Duties of State 
Attorneys General, 4 NAA GAZETTE 10 (2010), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR3T-BU4G]. (noting that the district attorney “pointed 
to no rule or statute that permits a district attorney, in the exercise of [] duties, to 
disregard the direction, control, and instruction of the attorney general . . . . Where, 
as here, the attorney general clearly directs and instructs that litigation on behalf of 
the State be dismissed, his instructions in that regard take precedence over a district 
attorney’s desire to proceed with the action.”). 
2018] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1251 
 
super preemption.  First, states and private parties can make implied 
preemption arguments, claiming that state legislation which does not 
directly or obviously target city litigation nevertheless preempts it.  
Second, states can use express preemption and pass legislation that 
clearly and obviously prohibits city litigation.  Third, some new 
“super preemption” laws may technically prohibit litigation (though 
they tend to exist in areas where litigation is already uncommon). 
1. Implied Preemption 
Implied preemption provides one way that legislation can preempt 
plaintiff city litigation.  Implied preemption occurs when states or 
private parties argue that a particular piece of state legislation 
prohibits city action, even though the legislation does not expressly 
articulate or offer “clear guidance” regarding the preemption being 
argued.54  Implied preemption played an important role in the 
plaintiff city litigation over the sub-prime mortgage crisis, as banks 
and financial institutions frequently argued (mostly successfully) that 
cities could not bring suit against them for the consequences of the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis because state legislation implicitly 
preempted such municipal claims.55 
Many courts agreed with the banks’ arguments that the statutory 
wording at issue meant that the State had intended to occupy the 
field, and thereby prevent cities from both regulating and litigating.56  
In City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., for 
example, the court said that an Ohio law expressly preempting 
municipalities from regulating in the area of mortgage loans also 
implicitly included a prohibition on municipal litigation in the area.57  
The statute at issue included in its definition of regulation “other 
actions taken directly or indirectly,” and the court found that this 
 
 54. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114, 1116 (2007).  
In practice, virtually all implied preemption claims are brought by private parties 
seeking to get out from under the regulation. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., 621 F. 
Supp. 2d 513, 517 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
 56. “Some plaintiff city suits are also preempted by federal legislation, as was the 
case when Los Angeles’s case against JPMorgan for predatory lending was 
preempted by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act.” 
Swan, supra note 18, at n.325 (citing Jonathan Stempel, JPMorgan Wins Dismissal of 
Los Angeles Lawsuit over Mortgage Lending, REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorganchase-losangeles-lawsuit-
idUSKBN0G62AT20140806 [https://perma.cc/9JD6-9K3A]). 
 57. 621 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18. 
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broad language “preempts more than just traditional legislative and 
administrative efforts;” it also encompasses common law based 
litigation.58  The court declared: 
Without question, common law actions for damages represent an 
important manner of regulating conduct [ . . . ] The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that the judicial process can be 
viewed as the extension of a government’s regulatory power. [ . . . ] 
Given the expansive wording of the statute and the powerful 
regulatory potential of common law damage claims, the Court finds 
that [the statute] includes common law public nuisance claims like 
the one asserted by the City.59 
Later, in City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 
the district court found that the City’s public nuisance claims against 
the bank were similarly preempted by the Ohio statute reserving 
regulatory power over credit to the state.60 
Implied preemption also resulted in the dismissal of a lead paint 
case in New Jersey.  In Re Lead Paint Litigation involved a number 
of lead paint companies, which successfully argued that the state Lead 
Paint Act and Products Liability Act preempted a public nuisance 
claim brought by “twenty-six municipalities and counties.”61  A two-
judge dissent, however, disagreed with the four-member majority 
opinion, instead arguing that public nuisance “exists independent of 
any legislative pronouncement.”62  The dissent found that “[t]he Lead 
Paint Act and the public nuisance doctrine” were in fact 
“complementary mechanisms aimed at the same evil.”63 
As the vociferous dissent in In Re Lead Paint Litigation suggests, 
implied litigation preemption arguments are not always well-
received.64  Some state courts impose a very high bar on implied 
preemption arguments, requiring “an express statement of intent to 
preempt before any such preemption will be found.”65 
 
 58. Id. at 518. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 897 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2012). 
 61. 924 A.2d 484, 486–87 (N.J. 2007). 
 62. Id. at 508 (Zazzali, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. 
      64. Id. 
 65. Sarah Fox, Home Rule in an Era of Local Environmental Innovation, 44 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 575, 597 n.165.  New York and Kansas courts are examples of this. Id. 
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2. Express Preemption 
Unlike the ambiguity which drives implied preemption cases, states 
sometimes use legislation to expressly and quite clearly prohibit city 
litigation.66 This express preemption power is so broad that it may 
actually extend to state litigation as well.  Ohio’s state legislature 
tested the limits of express preemption in the early 2000s.  At that 
time, many Ohio cities, as well as the State of Ohio, had all brought 
suits over lead paint poisoning.67  After the city cases were dismissed, 
the Ohio General Assembly passed legislation to terminate the state 
litigation.68  The battle over the state litigation went to the Ohio 
Supreme Court, and “nearly resulted in a constitutional crisis.”69  In 
2009, a new state attorney general chose to voluntarily stop the state 
lead paint litigation, thus ending the difficult preemption issue 
presented.70 
That exceptional case illustrates just how expansive express 
preemption powers may be, but the much more common use of 
states’ express preemption relates to city litigation.  Express 
preemption was a frequent occurrence in the gun litigation context, 
where states passed legislation that explicitly preempted city 
litigation.71  For example, after New Orleans filed a plaintiff city gun 
 
 66. See Diller, supra note 54, at 1115 (noting that, with a few exceptions, for 
express preemption “the court’s task is relatively simple: to determine whether the 
challenged ordinance falls within the subject matter that the legislature expressly 
preempted”). 
 67. David J. Owsiany, The Rise and Fall of Lead Paint Litigation in Ohio, 1 
STATE AG TRACKER (2009), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-rise-
and-fall-of-lead-paint-litigation-in-ohio [https://perma.cc/C7XE-V369]. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Congress also passed the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms 
Act, which barred the vast majority of plaintiff city claims against the gun industry. 15 
U.S.C. § 7901 (2018).  There was, however, some minimal space to make claims.  For 
example, in City of N.Y v. Bob Moates’ Sport Shop, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 237, 238 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008), 
[t]he City of New York brought an equitable civil action against out of-state 
gun retailers for allegedly creating a public nuisance by illegally and 
negligently furnishing firearms to prohibited persons that were then 
trafficked into New York City.  The court ruled that the PLCAA did not 
preempt the city’s claim because the city had alleged and proffered evidence 
supporting the conclusion that defendants’ participation in straw purchases 
violated predicate federal statutes specifically relating to the sale and 
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litigation suit in 1998, the Louisiana legislature passed La. R.S. 
40:1799.  That statute declared that: 
The governing authority of any political subdivision or local or other 
governmental authority of the state is precluded and preempted 
from bringing suit to recover against any firearms or ammunition 
manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages for injury, 
death, or loss or to seek other injunctive relief resulting from or 
relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of 
firearms or ammunition. The authority to bring such actions as may 
be authorized by law shall be reserved exclusively to the state.72 
In Morial v. Smith & Wesson, the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that this statutory wording did indeed preempt New Orleans’s 
existing suit.73  In a similar vein, in Philadelphia v. Beretta, the 
Pennsylvania court found that a 1999 amendment to the state 
Uniform Firearm Act deprived Philadelphia of the power to sue 
because it specifically barred a variety of municipal suits against gun 
manufacturers.74  In Sturm v. Atlanta, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
reached a similar conclusion based on Georgia’s statutory language.75 
 
marketing of firearms, as well as a predicate state statute declaring that any 
unlawfully possessed, transported or disposed handgun is a nuisance. 
Gun Industry Immunity, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/gun-industry-
immunity/ [https://perma.cc/S6AT-CK5Z]. 
 72. LA. STAT. ANN. § 1799 (1999) (quoted in Morial v. Smith & Wesson, 785 So. 
2d 1, 19 (La. 2001)). 
 73. 785 So. 2d at 21. 
 74. 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 75. 253 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).  The amendment at issue in Sturm 
said: 
[t]he authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearm or 
ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer by or on behalf of 
any governmental unit created by or pursuant to an Act of the General 
Assembly or the Constitution, or any department, agency, or authority 
thereof, for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or 
relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or 
ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to the state. This 
paragraph shall not prohibit a political subdivision or local government 
authority from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition 
manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or 
ammunition purchased by the political subdivision or local government 
authority. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-173 (2005).  Sturm is also notable in that the State of Georgia 
filed an amicus brief, itself arguing that its state legislation had preempted the city 
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In some cases, the statutory wording was focused on prohibiting 
localities from regulating guns, creating more ambiguity for the 
courts.  Generally, though, if the statutory language is broad enough, 
many courts have held that the legislation could also preempt plaintiff 
city gun litigation.76  There is an important exception: one ongoing 
case, City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, has survived a preemption 
challenge. In that case, the City of Gary sued firearm manufacturers, 
wholesalers, and dealers, bringing claims for public nuisance, 
negligent distribution of guns, and negligent design.77  At the trial 
level, the court held that the suit was barred by an Indiana statute 
prohibiting localities from regulating guns.78  The court of appeals, 
however, disagreed.  The appellate court distinguished litigation from 
regulation, finding that although the relevant section of the Indiana 
Code prevented cities from regulating firearms, the City’s lawsuit was 
not a form of regulation.79  The court characterized the suit as seeking 
“redress under existing state law of nuisance and negligence,”80 and 
held that since “Indiana statutes expressly authorize the City to seek 
relief against public nuisances,” the plaintiff city claim could 
proceed.81  In response, Indiana has enacted legislation that more 
explicitly prohibits the litigation.82 
3. Super Preemption 
Leaving aside the exception of Gary, the initial state preemption 
laws, along with the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms 
 
litigation. 253 S.E.2d at 529.  The court characterized the State’s argument as follows: 
“[t]he State contends that under Georgia’s Constitution and laws, it alone has the 
power to regulate the manufacture, sale, distribution, and promotion of firearms and 
the lawsuit is an attempt by the City to usurp the governmental power and authority 
of Georgia’s General Assembly. We agree.” Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV 990153198S, 1999 WL 
1241909 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 
1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 77. 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 1238. 
 79. Id. at 1239. 
 80. Id. at 1238. 
 81. Id. at 1239. 
 82. See Editorial, Gun Makers’ Pals: State Legislators Defend Industry Against 
Suit, J. GAZETTE (July 27, 2018, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.journalgazette.net/opinion/20180727/gun-makers-pals 
[https://perma.cc/9U8R-R4YU]. 
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Act, effectively ended municipal gun litigation.83  Thus, the new wave 
of firearm “super preemption” laws has little practical effect on the 
already essentially non-existent city firearms litigation.  Nevertheless, 
these “super preemption” statutes, which threaten local officials with 
“fines, civil liability, or removal from office for enacting or enforcing 
firearms measures,”84 may impact whether plaintiff city gun litigation 
could occur in the future.85  Most gun super preemption laws make no 
specific reference to litigation; thus, arguments that they do not 
preempt litigation are at least theoretically possible.  To be sure, in 
many instances there will be strong arguments that super preemption 
laws do preclude city firearms litigation—many super preemption 
laws seem designed to cast as wide a preemption net as possible, and, 
as already noted, many courts have held that words like “any activity” 
in regulatory preemption statutes include city litigation.86  But other 
courts, like the court in Gary, have taken the opposite view.87  Much 
turns on the specific statutory wording, and courts in the past have 
been sometimes certain and other times less convinced that litigation 
should be lumped in with general regulatory activities. 88 
One of the problems with super preemption, though, is that it may 
prevent these contestations from ever happening.  Super preemption 
laws are likely to have a chilling effect on the ability of cities to test 
the boundaries of litigation preemption.89  If a city considered testing 
the limits of the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
or state preemption legislation and engage in litigation against the 
firearm industry, the punitive consequences associated with “super 
preemption” would almost certainly be a formidable deterrent.90  
 
 83. “At present, 34 states provide either blanket immunity to the gun industry in a 
way similar to the PLCAA or prohibit cities or other local government entities from 
bringing lawsuits against certain gun industry defendants.” Gun Industry Immunity, 
supra note 71.  “Those states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia.” Id. 
 84. Briffault, supra note 4, at 2003. 
 85. Id. at 2004. 
 86. See, e.g., discussion of City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, 
Inc., at infra Section I.C.1. 
 87. See City of Gary, 801 N.E.2d at 1238–39. 
 88. See infra Section I.C.1. 
 89. Briffault, supra note 4, at 2022. 
 90. Id. at 2023. 
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When the consequences of overstepping the preemption line are so 
severe, cities are unlikely to test where it lies.91 
II.  EXPLAINING LITIGATION NON-PREEMPTION 
As the preceding section shows, states can and do engage in 
litigation preemption.  However, on the whole, states have generally 
been relatively restrained in their approach to plaintiff city litigation.  
In fact, in recent disputes over opioid litigation, states have refrained 
from engaging in a number of potential confrontations with plaintiff 
cities.92  Some states have publicly expressed displeasure with cities’ 
litigation efforts against opioid companies and turf wars have 
certainly developed, but states have thus far been reluctant to avail 
themselves of all the tools in their litigation preemption arsenals.93 
 
 91. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2006) is a good example of this type of 
law and appears to be a disturbing overreach on the part of the state government.  
Section 41-194.01 provides that “[a]t the request of one or more members of the 
legislature, the attorney general shall investigate any ordinance, regulation, order or 
other official action adopted or taken by the governing body of a county, city or town 
that the member alleges violates state law or the Constitution of Arizona.”  ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2006).  If the State Attorney General finds that there is 
indeed a municipal violation of state law, the local government has thirty days “to 
resolve the violation,” or it “lose[s] all state funding.” Id. 
 92. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 96.  States have also not been overly-
interested in engaging in litigation preemption in the climate change context.  Many 
cities have recently engaged in environmental and climate change litigation, including 
Boulder, New York City, San Francisco, Oakland, and Richmond (California), as 
well as various counties. John Schwartz, Climate Lawsuits, Once Limited to the 
Coasts, Jump Inland, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/climate/exxon-climate-lawsuit-colorado.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2JTkYg8].  But between 2012 and 2017, only two states passed 
preemption laws directed at climate change – North Carolina in 2012 and Oklahoma 
in 2014 – and it is not clear whether these would encompass litigation. See Elizabeth 
Daigneau, Will States Stop Cities from Combatting Climate Change? GOVERNING 
(Jan. 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-
climate-change-states-cities-preemption.html [https://perma.cc/5DGH-8HHN].  One 
scholar writing in 2018 noted that “state preemption with respect to local climate 
policy is still uncommon.” Dorothy M. Daley, Climate Change and State and Local 
Governments: Multiple Dimensions of Intergovernmental Conflict, 51 PS: POL. SCI. 
& POL. 33 (Jan. 2018).  However, at least in the opioid context, more conflicts could 
be coming.  South Carolina, for instance, “commissioned an opinion from its attorney 
general on whether cities and counties had independent standing to file their own 
[opioid] suits.” Fisher, supra note 36. 
 93. Sometimes, cities and states simply adopt different approaches, but do so 
amicably. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1272.  For an example of differences in 
litigating perspectives that appears to be relatively amicable, in which the city of 
Dayton sued more opioid defendants, but Ohio seems to have not complained, see 
Alan Johnson, Doctors, Cardinal Health Included in Cities’ Lawsuits over Opioid 
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A dispute between the City of Reno and the State of Nevada 
provides a good example of this dynamic.  In the fall of 2017, the 
State Attorney General of Nevada sent a letter to the Mayor of Reno, 
stating that if Reno went ahead with its stated goal of initiating 
litigation against the opioid industry, this plaintiff city litigation would 
“undermine Nevada’s position in the multistate investigation” and 
“thwart . . . any potential discussions with opioid manufacturers, and 
any potential agreements that could uniformly address the opioid 
crisis in Nevada.”94  The State Attorney General acknowledged that 
the City would be able to make certain exclusive legal claims that the 
State could not, but maintained that the State had “primary 
jurisdiction” over deceptive trade practices litigation and resources 
that the City lacked.95 
Reno’s mayor was unmoved by the letter, instead issuing a 
statement suggesting that the State and City likely disagreed not only 
about how best to pursue opioid litigation, but also about how to use 
any settlement funds that might result.96  In her view, the attorney 
general’s proposed  “unified front” and the mayor’s proposed “multi-
pronged attack” were “not mutually exclusive.”97  Reno voted in 
early 2018 to move forward with its litigation.98  Later that year, the 
State of Nevada filed its own opioid litigation lawsuit against Purdue 
 
Epidemic, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 5, 2017, 10:39 PM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/news/20170605/doctors-cardinal-health-included-in-cities-
lawsuits-over-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/EZC6-EDLF].  Dayton’s city suit 
came a week after the state suit that just targeted manufacturers. See Jackie 
Borchardt, Dayton, Loraine to Sue Opioid Makers, Drug Distributors and Doctors, 
CLEVELAND (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/06/dayton_lorain_to_sue_opioid_ma.
html [https://perma.cc/BZ4L-Q82P]. 
 94. See Riley Snyder, Laxalt to Schieve: Reno Lawsuit Against Opioid 
Manufacturers Could Undermine Ongoing State Litigation, NEV. INDEP. (Nov. 9, 
2017, 10:44 PM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/laxalt-to-schieve-reno-
lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers-could-undermine-ongoing-state-litigation 
[https://perma.cc/AJN7-3EQ2]. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Anjeanette Damon, Opioid Lawsuit: Reno Lawyer Makes Bid for the Case If 
City Sues, RENO GAZETTE J. (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2017/11/27/opioid-lawsuit-reno-lawyer-makes-bid-
case-if-city-sues/899853001/ [https://perma.cc/2HXK-CUQJ]. 
 98. Michael Scott Davidson, Reno Follows Clark County in Using Las Vegas Law 
Firm for Opioid Lawsuit, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 10, 2018, 6:24 PM), 
https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/clark-county/reno-
follows-clark-county-in-using-las-vegas-law-firm-for-opioid-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EY8-P4W8]. 
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Pharma, but has not taken further actions opposing Reno.99  Indeed, 
the State Attorney General faced significant political heat for the 
voiced opposition to the plaintiff city litigation, with an opponent in 
the gubernatorial race noting that the attorney general is 
“discouraging a City of Reno lawsuit against opioid manufacturers 
while taking thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from 
those companies.”100 Perhaps because of this dynamic, when Reno 
did file its suit in September 2018, Nevada’s Attorney General’s office 
issued a conciliatory statement, saying, “We welcome the city of Reno 
to the ongoing fight to curb Nevada’s opioid epidemic.”101 
A similar turf war ensued between Tennessee and a group of 
Tennessee counties.  Initially, the Republican State Attorney General 
took issue with an opioid lawsuit initiated by forty-seven Tennessee 
counties, arguing that it would “impede [his] ability to prosecute all of 
the opioid litigation implicating the State’s interests” and that the 
counties were wrong to use contingency-fee based private attorneys 
to help bring their case.102  He brought a motion to intervene in a 
number of these lawsuits,103 but later withdrew the motion with no 
explanation.104 
 
 99. See Press Release, Adam Paul Laxalt, Nev. Att’y Gen., Nev. Att’y Gen. 
Website, Attorney General Laxalt Files Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturer to 
Combat Nevada’s Opioid Epidemic (May 15, 2018), 
http://ag.nv.gov/News/PR/2018/Attorney_General_Laxalt_Files_Lawsuit_Against_O
pioid_Manufacturer_to_Combat_Nevada%E2%80%99s_Opioid_Epidemic/ 
[https://perma.cc/PX5A-7C5N]. 
 100. Riley Snyder & Michelle Rindels, Governor Candidate Schwartz Backs Reno 
Opioid Lawsuit, Criticizes Laxalt for Opposing It, NEV. INDEP. (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/governor-candidate-schwartz-backs-reno-
opioid-lawsuit-criticizes-laxalt-for-opposing-it [https://perma.cc/4BMN-UXWK]. 
 101. City of Reno Files Lawsuits Against Distributors, Manufacturers of Opioids, 
MYNEWS4.COM (Sept. 18, 2018), https://mynews4.com/news/local/city-of-reno-files-
lawsuit-against-distributors-manufacturers-of-opioids [https://perma.cc/ZE7K-QJ4L]. 
 102. Fisher, supra note 36.  The County claims were filed by county district 
attorneys. Press Release, Herbert H. Slattery III, Tenn. Att’y Gen., Tenn. Att’y Gen. 
Website, Statement on Opioid Litigation (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/news/2018/3/21/pr18-09.html 
[https://perma.cc/5CXU-P4PN]. 
 103. State Attorney General Intervenes in Opioids Lawsuit, INDEP. HERALD 
ONEIDA (Mar. 27, 2018), http://ihoneida.com/2018/03/27/state-attorney-general-
intervenes-in-opioids-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/RPS3-VRM9]. 
 104. Rain Smith, Tennessee Attorney General Backs off Challenge to Local 
Opioid Lawsuit, KINGSPORT TIMES NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018, 10:58 AM), 
http://www.timesnews.net/Law-Enforcement/2018/04/13/Attorney-general-backs-off-
challenge-to-local-opioid-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/Z85C-75WC].  In a different 
context, a city made a similar move—Lake Elmo intervened in Minnesota’s suit 
against 3M. Nick Ferraro, Lake Elmo Pulls out of Lawsuit Against 3M, TWIN CITIES 
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In Oklahoma, Oklahoma City recently brought an opioid suit on its 
own, despite an earlier state suit.  While the Oklahoma Attorney 
General cautioned that state laws regarding city recovery might 
impact the city’s lawsuit, the state’s counsel publicly “wished 
Oklahoma City well.”105 
Thus, although states have many tools at their disposal to stop 
plaintiff city litigation, including entering into their own settlements 
with defendants, directly suing cities for orders of dismissal, and 
enacting legislation that either expressly or impliedly preempts city 
claims, states, for the most part, have not interfered with plaintiff city 
litigation.106  Unlike in the regulatory preemption context, states have 
generally not sought to confine or circumscribe city litigative power in 
a more punitive way than they have before. Neither the tenor nor the 
pace of states’ approach to city litigation has tracked the massive 
upheaval evident in their overhauled approach to city regulation. 
What accounts for the stark difference between state-city battles 
over city powers of regulation versus state-city battles over city 
powers of litigation?  There are three main factors at work.  The first 
is the states’ history of bipartisan litigation.  The second is the 
difference in the issues being litigated versus the issues being 
regulated.  The third is the nature of litigation as a perceived form of 
governance. 
A. Litigation Bipartisanship 
There is almost unanimous scholarly agreement that the rise of 
regulatory hyper preemption is fueled by extreme partisan divide.107  
Specifically, “[t]he driving cause behind the recent preemption trend 
 
PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:01 PM), 
https://www.twincities.com/2013/08/13/lake-elmo-pulls-out-of-lawsuit-against-3m/ 
[https://perma.cc/HU5P-D7P5].  Later, following a turn-over in the local government, 
Lake Elmo withdrew in order to “collaborate” with 3M on monitoring. Id.  The State 
did not publicly take a position on the city’s intervention, but 3M opposed it, on the 
basis that what Lake Elmo was doing was analogous to what Dover did in State v. 
Dover, 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006). Id.; see also Josephine Marcotty, Minnesota 
Settlement with 3M May Fix Drinking Water but Not the Environment, STAR TRIB. 
(Mar. 3, 2018, 7:35 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-settlement-with-3m-
may-fix-drinking-water-but-not-the-environment/475741593/ [https://perma.cc/HG33-
GVKA]. 
 105. William Crum, Oklahoma City Council Moves Ahead with Opioid Litigation, 
NEWSOK (Aug. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://newsok.com/article/5603264/oklahoma-city-
council-moves-ahead-with-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/2EDQ-JX3L]. 
 106. See supra Part I. 
 107. See, e.g., Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 407. 
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is a striking political phenomenon: Cities across the nation are 
becoming more Democratic, while state legislatures are becoming 
more Republican.”108 
In the litigation context, though, states have often been able to 
overcome such extreme partisan divide.  The lubricant for this 
litigative flexibility has been financial—the prospect of refilling state 
coffers and recouping the losses caused by the litigated harms has 
historically tended to bridge state partisan gaps.109  Indeed, much of 
the large-scale attorney general affirmative litigation against private 
industries has been bipartisan.110  For instance, all fifty states were 
part of a 2012 settlement with a number of major banks for the 
wrongs committed in the aftermath of sub-prime mortgage crisis.111 
As scholar Paul Nolette writes in his study of bipartisanship in state 
litigation, this bipartisanship is somewhat surprising, given that 
Republican attorneys general could be expected to reject state-led 
litigation on the grounds that it works against their usual agenda of 
deregulation and decreased governmental involvement in private 
sector machinations.112  Republicans put this concern aside when it 
comes to involvement in litigation, however, because litigation often 
results in corporations paying substantial amounts in settlements or 
judgments.113  To get a piece of this compensation pie, state attorneys 
general must participate in the litigation.114  Thus, even “conservative 
Republicans” like Alabama State Attorney General William Pryor, 
 
 108. Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133, 136 (2017); see also Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 406 
(noting that “[i]f the surge of preemption litigation in recent years has been fueled in 
part by efforts of industry groups and conservative organizations to rein in cities, it 
can also be attributed to the growing Republican control of state legislatures, 
especially after the tide turned in Republicans’ favor during the 2010 elections”). 
 109. NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 28. 
 110. Id. (noting that “[p]revious research has indicated that coordinated litigation 
against private industries, at least coordinated consumer protection litigation, tends 
to attract largely bipartisan participation among AGs”). 
 111. Jeffrey Stinson, When States Win Lawsuits, Where Does the Money Go, 
STATELINE (Feb. 19, 2015, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/02/19/stateline-states-
lawsuits/23675241/ [https://perma.cc/2TMG-XSKM].  Nolette characterizes the 
settlement slightly differently, as a “$26 billion settlement in 2012 with the six largest 
national banks to settle investigations into the banks’ role in the mortgage crisis of 
the late 2000s.” NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 24. 
 112. NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 28. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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who decried most forms of state litigation, nonetheless participated in 
the tobacco settlement agreement in 1998.115 
State litigation bipartisanship was also evident in the early acid rain 
cases and in pharmaceutical litigation.116  In the acid rain cases in the 
1980s, states tended to form litigation coalitions along “regional, 
rather than partisan lines.”117  Similarly, in pharmaceutical litigation, 
which makes up “more than one-fifth of all multistate litigation 
targeting private industry,” there has been a norm of “bipartisan 
cooperation” among state attorneys general.118  Republican buy-in 
has been attributed both to the fact that litigation is only “subtly 
regulatory” and to the reality that the possibility of participating in 
settlements and judgments provides state attorneys general with a 
“clear incentive” to join their democratic counterparts.119 
These same two factors are also present in plaintiff city litigation.  
Cities often sue for damages, and compensation to cities means fuller 
municipal coffers, which can indirectly translate into less of a strain 
on state budgets.120  Further, plaintiff city litigation is similarly only 
subtly regulatory.121 
B. Political Divisiveness 
Another factor that likely drives states’ more tolerant approach to 
plaintiff city litigation is that the harms cities are litigating over attract 
almost universal condemnation.  Lead paint poisoning, the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, and the opioid epidemic are all widely acknowledged 
to be egregious harms which have caused significant damage to public 
health and safety, and which have demanded significant expenditures 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 162. 
 117. Id. at 160. (“What stands out in AGs’ earliest collaborations on acid rain 
issues is that these battles were fairly contained and fought more on regional rather 
than partisan lines.  All of the AGs seeking stricter EPA regulation during the 1980s 
represented down-wind Northeastern states, with the exception of Minnesota’s 
Hubert Humphrey III.  All the AGs who sided with the EPA’s position against new 
air pollution controls represented upwind Midwestern or Southern states, with AGs 
from other regions sitting on the sidelines.  The litigation was bipartisan, as 
Democratic and Republican AGs from the Northeast joined in all eight of the 
multistate acid rain cases during this period, while they were opposed in two cases by 
Democratic AGs representing Midwestern and Southern states.”). 
 118. Id. at 23–24. 
 119. Id. at 163. 
 120. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1280. 
 121. See id. at 1269. 
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from states and cities in response.122  Indeed, states themselves have 
also sued (often in bipartisan litigation) over many of these harms.123 
In contrast, there is much less consensus regarding issues like the 
appropriate scope of the Second Amendment, whether anti-
discrimination laws can include sexual orientation without infringing 
on religious liberty, and the impact of sanctuary cities on 
immigration.124  While some of the city ordinances that have attracted 
state regulatory preemption seem ridiculously innocuous, like plastic 
bag bans, or sprinkler regulation, many are matters of hotly debated 
public contestation.125  While there are many persuasive arguments 
for city regulation in these contested areas, city litigation over less-
contentious issues raises substantially less state ire. 
C. Litigation v. Regulation 
The final factor softening states’ response to plaintiff city litigation 
lies in the nature of litigation itself.  While regulation is a 
quintessential power of governing, the link between litigation and 
governing is less obvious.  First, anyone who has been harmed can 
litigate; it is not a uniquely governmental action, and thus is not often 
seen as necessarily an exercise of political power.126 
Second, there is almost always a large amount of uncertainty 
associated with litigation.127  What a court and a jury will ultimately 
decide is not under the control of the litigating party.  In fact, the vast 
majority of plaintiff city litigation has actually thus far achieved only a 
few judicial victories.128  The bulk of plaintiff city litigation has been 
dismissed on various doctrinal and standing grounds.129  It is thus far 
from certain that bringing a claim means winning a claim.  Unlike 
regulation, litigation is not a simple translation of the city’s will into 
 
 122. See id. at 1281–82. 
 123. Id. at 1253. 
 124. Hicks et al., supra note 10, at 26. 
 125. See id. at 1276. 
 126. State parens patriae litigation may be an exception to this, but cities lack 
parens patriae power. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1253. 
 127. Nevertheless, “[a]lthough the litigation by itself may not always produce 
immediate and sweeping results, it can function as part of an effective political 
strategy for achieving social reform.” SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS: 
CHILD WELFARE LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 5–6 (2000). 
 128. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1231 (explaining that the expressive and political 
value of plaintiff city litigation, however, does not depend on the cases actually 
winning). 
 129. Id. at 1231. 
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reality.  Instead, that will is mediated by existing law, by courts, and 
by juries. Litigation can move the law forward in progressive ways, 
but it can also cause it to contract.  Parties can try to “make” law 
through litigation, but whether or not they will achieve this goal as 
intended is always unknown.  As a governance tool, then, litigation is 
unreliable and subject to the checks and balances of the law as 
interpreted and applied by other actors.  So far, in the plaintiff city 
context, those checks and balances have largely stymied city litigation. 
  
Ultimately, the precise nature of the relationship between 
litigation, regulation, and governing is deeply contested.  Some forms 
of litigation have been linked to future general deterrence, but there 
is a dearth of research in this area.130  And although one prominent 
scholarly argument insists that litigation is a form of regulation when 
industry defendants agree to settlement terms which govern their 
future actions, this argument has many detractors.131  The connection, 
or lack thereof, between litigation and regulation is often contested in 
the implied preemption cases.  In the majority of such cases, 
defendants in plaintiff city cases argue that, since cities lack the power 
to regulate in a particular area, they are impermissibly using litigation 
and courts as an end run around this obstacle.132 
As one judge pointed out, the problem with this argument is that 
the regulatory effect of plaintiff city litigation is essentially equivalent 
to the regulatory effect of all litigation.133  Thus, to equate plaintiff 
city litigation with regulation would be like saying “that an injured 
plaintiff is attempting to regulate the automobile industry when he 
sues to recover damages caused by faulty brakes, or that a survivor is 
attempting to regulate the airline industry when he sues the airline 
because his spouse was killed in an airplane crash.”134  However, 
 
 130. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing? 195 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
17-40, 2018). 
 131. But see, e.g., Morial v. Smith & Wesson, 785 So. 2d 1, 20 (La. 2001) (Calogero, 
J., dissenting). See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 
(2002). 
 132. Laura L. Gavioli, Comment, Who Should Pay: Obstacles to Cities in Using 
Affirmative Litigation as a Source of Revenue, 78 TUL. L. REV. 941, 952 (2004).  To 
be sure, cities often explicitly indicate that they are looking to litigate because a 
governance gap has allowed the harm to flourish. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 18, at 
1269; see also Lisa Vanhala & Chris Hilson, Climate Change Litigation: Symposium 
Introduction, L. & POL’Y 141, 143 (2013). 
 133. Morial, 785 So.2d at 20. 
 134. Id. 
2018] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1265 
 
other courts have held that this is just so—all private party common 
law actions are in fact regulatory.135  Despite these debates, one thing 
that is clear is that litigation is not as obviously regulatory as 
regulation itself, and this fact seems to have contributed to the 
tolerance of plaintiff city litigation. 
III.  THE SPACE FOR PLAINTIFF CITY LITIGATION 
Generally speaking, then, states have left cities with a significant 
amount of litigation leeway.  Within this space, cities are able to 
achieve some of the same kinds of progressive ends as they seek to 
promote through regulation.  Obviously, the many private plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who often partner with plaintiff cities and pursue claims on 
a contingency fee basis136 likely believe that plaintiff city claims can 
and will achieve success at some point, particularly because they can, 
and often do, serve as a source of revenue for the city.137 But 
regardless of potential success, plaintiff city claims themselves have 
political value: They serve as a means by which cities express political 
values and define their polities.138 
Plaintiff cities tend to litigate issues that have their most 
detrimental impact on vulnerable populations.139  For example, much 
of the plaintiff city activity has occurred in the areas of gun violence, 
lead paint poisoning, environmental harms, and the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis.  These areas all have significant racial dimensions.140  
Gun violence is a public harm that disproportionately affects African 
American and Hispanic communities—members of both communities 
are statistically much more likely than whites to be the victims of gun 
violence.141  Similarly, lead paint poisoning is a disease that has been 
 
 135. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008). 
 136. Swan, supra note 18, at 1280. 
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WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2014), 
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“largely eliminated” in wealthy white neighborhoods, and now 
“primarily impacts African-Americans” in poorer areas.142  Indeed, 
environmental harms more broadly are racialized, as a comprehensive 
study from Harvard University confirmed when it found that in 
America, “black people are about three times more likely to die from 
exposure to airborne pollutants than others.”143  The subprime 
mortgage crisis follows a similar pattern, with its heaviest impact on 
minority populations, specifically on African American 
homeowners.144 
Additionally, another active area of plaintiff city litigation – opioid 
litigation – mostly impacts yet another vulnerable population: the 
disabled.145  Patients experiencing pain and difficulty functioning are 
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the most common victims of opioid addictions, and a recent study 
suggests that patients with certain mental disorders are significantly 
more likely to receive long-term opioid prescriptions, creating a 
situation where “[t]he very folks who are most vulnerable to opioids’ 
deadliest effects are unusually likely to get a long-term supply of the 
drugs.”146 
In bringing litigation in these areas and demanding redress for 
harms impacting vulnerable and minority populations, cities are 
affirming the place and inherent value of these groups within the 
polity.147  Plaintiff city litigation has specific, expressive value both to 
members of those harmed communities and beyond.  Cities are 
signalling to impacted community members that they have not been 
abandoned or discarded, instead they are an important component of 
the “collective project of making the social world.”148  Rather than 
contributing to the “legal estrangement” that racial minorities and 
vulnerable communities experience on many fronts,149 plaintiff city 
litigation promotes the progressive ideal of “democratic equality,” 
broadcasting to corporate wrongdoers and the world outside the city’s 
borders that “there is not a class or group of persons who are 
somehow entitled to mistreat another, ‘lower’ class or group.”150  
Plaintiff city litigation is a “public action with political significance,” a 
significance not necessarily determined by winning or losing, but by 
whether the litigation “widens the public imagination about right and 
wrong,” “mobilizes political action behind new social arrangements,” 
or both.151 
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Plaintiff city litigation is part of a larger struggle for local political 
ordering, and although it may not be able to achieve the exact same 
goals as local regulation, it can nonetheless serve some of the same 
broad purposes.152  Many of the preempted ordinances are rooted in 
goals of equity, diversity, and democracy— plaintiff city litigation 
largely shares these goals.153  And because states have been generally 
tolerant of plaintiff city litigation and have left a space for it, even as 
they aggressively attack local regulations, plaintiff city litigation offers 
an alternative path for cities seeking to advance progressive goals 
within these troubling state parameters. 
CONCLUSION 
Like the expressive meaning of plaintiff city litigation, regulatory 
preemption also has an important signalling function.  The new 
regulatory preemption laws are “a signal to cities . . . that they are 
powerless to find their own solutions to issues that directly impact 
them.”154  But while it is true that the new preemption laws pose a 
significant problem for local governance, cities are not completely 
powerless.  There is resistance.155  Cities have directly challenged 
regulatory preemption laws in the courtrooms and there is hope for 
some success.156 
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And cities still have some space to maneuver in the litigation 
context.  While states have been eager to preempt cities from 
engaging in regulation, they have been markedly less inclined to stop 
cities’ litigative efforts.  States have the ability to preempt city 
litigation through various means, including by entering into 
settlement agreements with industry actors, directly suing cities, or 
through legislation targeting city litigation; but they have not 
escalated their use of these tools, despite the hundreds of plaintiff city 
claims currently pending.  Although plaintiff city litigation cannot 
resolve the highly contentious social issues which are on the frontline 
of new super or nuclear preemption laws, plaintiff city litigation still 
provides a parallel path for some cities to advance broad goals of 
urban social justice.  It has expressive and political value, and even in 
this era of bitter divide between many cities and states, it remains a 
viable option for many localities. 
